Putin’s superpower play

October 29th, 2006

Russia has a new weapon with which to bully the West: its vast energy reserves. As the world’s biggest supplier of oil and gas, the Kremlin is determined that industrial muscle will succeed where Marxism failed. When a 32-year-old KGB agent called Vladimir Putin was invited to attend the Red Banner Institute in Moscow, one of the Soviet Union’s elite spy colleges, he couldn’t believe his luck.

It was 1984 and the young but deeply ambitious Putin was soon being groomed as a specialist in economic and technological espionage. His teachers were still revelling in a now long-forgotten victory over America: gas was flowing from a brand new Russian pipeline to Western Germany, earning much needed hard cash, despite a lengthy campaign by President Ronald Reagan to block its construction with sanctions.

The pipeline came too late for the Soviets but Putin never forgot what he was taught in Moscow: Russia’s massive energy resources are a powerful weapon in the global power stakes. He reheated the idea in 1997 when he wrote an influential article for a Russian journal recommending that Russia regain control of its energy industry; now, at the height of his powers as President of Russia, he is busily putting his old plans into practice. In doing so this veteran Cold War warrior is waging a new Cold War, as was all too apparent from a disastrous meeting with European ministers last week, though this time Russian power – and the threat that goes with it – is dependent not on Marxism or missiles but on oil and gas.

Since the end of communism a decade and a half ago, Russia’s exports of oil and gas to the West have risen exponentially. New, Moscow-sponsored energy giants have risen while the world’s largest energy multinationals have all made huge investments in the country, turning Russia into the world’s biggest supplier of oil and gas. Combined exports are equivalent to nearly 19% of consumer countries’ demand, compared with just over 18% for Saudi Arabia.

In the early post-communist days, this seemed to be the answer to Europe’s energy problems (and some of America’s too). Now it is clear Putin’s plan all along was to ensure the West got hooked on Russian supplies – then use the dependency to exercise leverage and even control.

The plan has been some time in the making. Three years ago this week Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the founder of oil giant Yukos, was arrested on a bleak Siberian airstrip, marking the first step of the Kremlin’s plan to wrest control of energy production from private individuals and companies. Since then, oil and gas has been used as a tool of foreign policy, much like a weapon, rather than as a standard commodity bought and sold by profit-making corporations.

Oil and gas prices have more than doubled since Khodorkovsky’s arrest, delivering the Kremlin a financial windfall which it badly needed. Russia’s hard currency reserves have risen from a mere $9bn (£4.8bn, €7.2bn) before the 1998 financial crisis to more than $250bn today. Its economy has powered ahead, growing by 6.8% this year, on the back of rising energy prices. Average wages have surged from $50 a month when Putin came to power to $400; needless to say, this has made the Russian president a popular man.

But for politicians in Europe and America, the manner in which Putin and his comrades at state energy giants Gazprom and Rosneft have wielded their new power and wealth has taken tensions with the West to levels not seen in more than 20 years. Alexei Miller, Gazprom’s new chairman, bluntly laid out the new status quo at the World Gas Conference in June: “There are only three countries capable of being a long-term supplier of gas: Russia, Iran and Qatar. When it comes to gas for the development of the European economy, there is no realistic alternative to Russia.”

Last week, President Putin sounded just as confident – and aggressive. He warned European leaders to give up any hope of gaining access to Gazprom’s jealously protected gas reserves and network. Western politicians, he said, should not stand in the way of Gazprom’s efforts to push its ownership of gas networks deeper and deeper into Western Europe. As for daring to criticise his human rights record or heavy-handed bullying of Georgia and Ukraine (never mind his actions in Chechnya), this, he declared, was out of the question. Russia’s re-emergence as a superpower, this time on the back of energy, has made the President supremely indifferent to Western criticism on most issues, including the murder of investigative journalist Anna Poliykovskaya.

The first time Western Europe was attacked directly by Russia using energy as a weapon was when Gazprom cut off gas supplies to Ukraine in the new year, as punishment for turning its back on Kiev’s pro-Moscow political parties. The action also hit supplies to France, Germany and Italy – and thrust the now obvious problem of Europe’s growing energy dependence on Russia to the top of the political agenda. Not that greater prominence for this issue resolved anything: Europe failed to secure any kind of energy deal with Putin at July’s G8 summit in St Petersburg.

The list of Russian snubs and heavy-handed action keeps growing. Earlier this month plans to ship liquefied Russian gas to America from the giant Shtokman field in the Arctic were abruptly cancelled after more than five years of negotiations, destroying the hopes of US oil firms ConocoPhillips and Chevron to get a share of the project.

Now the oil majors tread warily in Moscow. They have every reason to: the regulatory and legislative powers abused in the destruction of Yukos are being applied to Royal Dutch Shell and, to a lesser extent, BP, Total and Exxon Mobil. Appeasement is the order of the day: BP’s decision, for example, to take a $1bn stake in Rosneft when it floated on the London Stock Exchange in July was widely seen as a way of assuaging the Russian government.

Russia’s neighbours, especially those in the Baltic, Poland, Belarus and Moldova, know only too well how mercilessly their former master can use its resources. In 2003 Russian state pipeline company Transneft arbitrarily decided to cease oil supplies to the Latvia’s Ventspils Nafta oil terminal, ending the port’s existence, in apparent revenge for Latvia’s ind- ependence. This year it did the same to Lithuania. When Polish oil company PKN Orlen beat Russia’s Lukoil and TNK-BP to buy Yukos’s share in Lithuania’s Mazeikiu Nafta refinery, Transneft again shut down pipeline supplies to the refinery, blaming an accident (the refinery was later damaged by fire).

In 2004, Gazprom shut off gas supplies to Belarus in a transparent attempt to bully it into giving Gazprom back ownership of its gas transmission pipeline. Poland is desperately looking to diversify its supplies, seeking to pipe in gas from Norway and even considering a liquefied natural gas terminal at Gdansk. Even Austria’s OMV, one of the first European customers of Russia’s gas, is pushing its neighbours to agree on the Nabucco pipeline to bring gas from Iran, suggesting Vienna regards the anti-Semitic, nuclear-obsessed Mullhas of Tehran a safer bet than Russia.

Last year Royal Dutch Shell admitted the construction costs of the Sakhalin gas project had doubled to $20bn. A few days earlier, it had agreed to sell Gazprom a 25% stake in the project in exchange for 50% of one of its Siberian gas fields, apparently without warning it of the impending bad news. This was a mistake: since then, regulatory pressure on Shell has increased massively and it could be forced to accept punishing new terms to keep control. Total and Exxon also face an endless run of obstacles to their projects.

Europe as a whole is likely to experience the rough end of Russia’s bargaining when it begins thrashing out a new bilateral agreement next month to replace the 10-year “Partnership and Cooperation Agreement” signed in 1997. This time, with energy prices high and Europe anxious for security of supply, Russia has genuine bargaining power, especially with Gazprom this year scheduled to complete negotiations with China’s CNPC on gas supplies.

Europe wants to strike a deal that allows solid contractual guarantees in energy deals between the two blocks. But it is understandably wary of giving Gazprom what it wants in return: control of the “downstream” – in other words gas pipelines, storage, pumping stations and even customer accounts. Part of the reason it cut gas supplies to Belarus in 2004 and to Ukraine at the start of 2005 was to pressure these countries to return control of transit pipelines. Gazprom has this year been pressuring European utilities such as Eon, RWE, GdF, Eni and Centrica to sell or swap stakes in their pipelines for shares in its Siberian gas fields.

Much of Europe’s gas infrastructure is, in theory, open to be acquired. But European politicians, in Brussels and in member- state capitals, have made it clear that it would block any large acquisitions on the grounds that Gazprom’s control of a quarter of Europe’s gas supplies would threaten competition. The European Competition Commission is expected also to outlaw the long-term bilateral gas contracts with which Gazprom has historically supplied clients.

Gazprom, of course, should not have such a strong hand to play. Europe may import a quarter of its gas from Russia but until Russia builds a pipeline to China or LNG terminals on its coasts, Gazprom can only supply one major customer: Europe. Russia’s importance as an American energy supplier is growing but remains minor (in August 2005 America imported 72,000 barrels of Russian crude per day (bpd): by this August imports had reached 167,000 bpd).

If Western utilities and governments negotiated as one, they would be in a stronger position. But Gazprom will almost certainly succeed in its efforts to frustrate a united front. The company has already developed a closer relationship with Germany, its largest customer, than with any other European country. In the New Energy Cold War, Germany is on Russia’s side. German energy giant Eon holds a small but significant stake in Gazprom, and Burckhard Bergmann, the chairman of its gas subsidiary, Eon Ruhrgas, is the only Western European to sit on Gazprom’s board.

In July Eon offered to swap a 25% stake in the Yuzhno Russkoye gas field in Siberia for large stakes in two of Eon’s Hungarian subsidiaries, much to the Hungarian government’s frustration. BASF’s Wintershall in April swapped a 35% stake in the same field for a further 15% in trading joint venture Wingas, bringing Gazprom’s share to 50%.

Scandalously, former German Chancellor Gerhard Shröder was even appointed to the board of Nord Stream, the Gazprom-led consortium building a $5bn pipeline under the Barents Sea to North Germany after he was replaced by Angela Merkel as German Chancellor; he had been instrumental in signing the deal in the first place. Politicians in Poland have pointed out that the pipeline allows the Russians to cut off its gas supplies without affecting the rest of Western Europe.

Sarah Mendelson, a senior fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, says: “If the Europeans have a unified response they have a lot more power to influence Russia than they seem to realise. When they do unify they have got the Russian government to back down on various things.” She describes the pursuit of sweetheart deals by individual European countries as “exactly the kind of thing that will leave us all in much worse shape”.

Europe seems determined not to learn: Dutch gas firm Gasunie earlier this month became the third European utility to offer Gazprom something it wants, gaining a stake in Nord Stream in exchange for giving the Russians a 9% stake in the new BBL pipeline which will this December start shipping European gas to Britain across the North Sea from the Netherlands.

Hawks in the Bush administration have been calling for America to get tough. Last May, Vice President Dick Cheney visited Lithuania, making a speech that was sharply critical of Russia’s drift towards authoritarian rule. But with America fighting on several fronts in the Middle East, Afghanistan and now North Korea – all regions where Moscow has considerable influence – Washington also has to take Russia seriously once more.

Indeed Putin is having his cake and eating it: while Moscow increasingly calls the energy shots, investment into Russia during the first half of 2006 jumped 42% to $23.4bn. Western banks are falling over themselves to fund Gazprom and Rosneft – and were not shy of lending a hand in the destruction of Yukos: this month Rosneft is in talks with a consortium of investment banks to lend it $15bn to $20bn to fund the acquisition of the remnants of Yukos.

The risk was put succinctly by America’s Council on Foreign Relations. “Unless it is associated with higher standards of corporate governance and commitment to commercial norms,” it said, “increased access by state-controlled Russian companies to international capital will not serve Western interests. It will mean that international investors are financing the expansion of Russian state power and control.” Unless the West understands this – and acts in unison to counteract Russia’s growing imperialistic ambitions – Putin will continue to win the new energy wars.

Monday, October 30, 2006

Shtokman Could Signal the End of Stability

By Samuel Charap

Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller’s announcement earlier this month that the huge Shtokman gas field in the Barents Sea would be developed without the participation of foreign partners, and that its production would be sold exclusively to Europe, sent shock waves through the investment community. The field, estimated to contain up to 4 trillion cubic meters of natural gas and more than 31 million tons of gas condensate, is one of the world’s largest undeveloped known deposits.

Negotiations between Gazprom and five Western energy majors — France’s Total, the Norwegian firms Statoil and Hydro and Chevron and ConocoPhillips from the United States — to determine which would enter into a consortium with the gas monopoly to develop the field had intensified since the short list of pretenders was announced last year. Because of its size, and the fact that it could open the way for Russian gas (in liquefied form) to penetrate the U.S. market, Shtokman was a crucial issue in Russia’s foreign relations. It was also the single largest foreign investment project on the table.

Acknowledging that developing the field represents an enormous technical challenge, Gazprom sought out foreign partners with the technology, specialists and experience it lacked. A consortium arrangement would also have spread the economic risks associated with the project. Gazprom will now have to turn to creditors to finance Shtokman’s development, which could cost as much as $50 billion by the time the field comes online. One of the U.S. firms could also have offered marketing connections on the downstream side in North America. In return for a minority stake in the development, Gazprom sought equity in the foreign companies.

One can only imagine the look on the faces of the executives at the five firms when the news came across the wires. Instead of informing the companies directly, Miller chose to drop the bombshell in an interview on Russia Today, a Kremlin-funded, English-language television channel that is often ridiculed as a propaganda mouthpiece in the West.

Immediately after the announcement, analysts with technical knowledge of gas-field development stated definitively that Gapzrom was incapable of going it alone unless the timeframe for the project were pushed back by several years and the cost estimate increased by as much as 15 percent. Even then, doubts remain about the feasibility of the project without foreign help. Gazprom has no experience in the development of a relatively remote offshore deposit of this immense size. Miller himself implicitly acknowledged this when he said the company would hire foreign firms as contractors.

It came as no surprise, however, that one of the five majors soon declared its unwillingness to participate in such an arrangement. Analysts expressed doubt that the market for offshore development contractors could in principle meet Gazprom’s needs for Shtokman.

In short, there appears to be no economic logic to Gazprom’s decision. So the question that arises is: Why? Since no one knows exactly what the foreign firms had put on the table, it is possible that the move was a not-so-subtle bargaining tactic. It could have been a saber-rattling gesture meant to scare the majors into improving their offers, which could well have been below fair value. Following President Vladimir Putin’s confirmation at a news conference in Germany of Gazprom’s plan to go it alone, however, the decision seems to be final.

This leaves two possibilities, neither of which bode well for Russia’s investment climate. Either Gazprom has decided that economic priorities — getting the field online according to the current timetable and cost estimates and tapping the U.S. market — are secondary to total state control, or Moscow has allowed this decision to become hostage to the downward spiral in Russia’s relations with the West, and with the United States in particular. Indeed, rumors circulated several months before the announcement that the U.S. firms might be excluded from the consortium because of Washington’s perceived intransigence in Russia’s WTO-accession negotiations. After Miller’s announcement these rumors only intensified.

No matter which of the two explanations are closer to the truth — or even if both factors played a role — the Shtokman decision is a turning point in Russia’s energy policy. Following the Yukos affair, the state established more or less stable rules of the game for cooperation with Western energy concerns. The primary guiding principle was that the national champions, Gazprom and Rosneft, would participate as majority stake-holders in all new development projects and should also be given shares in deals signed in the Yeltsin era that are perceived by the current regime as unfair. Foreign firms were encouraged to take up minority positions in these developments, as the state acknowledged that their expertise and resources were critical for accelerating the projects. Beyond these major caveats, however, the state preached cold-blooded economic pragmatism and rejected the practice of linking the task of making money to petty political concerns.

While this framework would seem to make Russia an unattractive place for foreign companies to do business, investors were relatively content. They are generally more concerned with the stability of the rules of the game, not their restrictiveness.

Many have argued that such ground rules, if they ever existed, were done away with long ago and that Shtokman fits into a pattern with the recent assault on Sakhalin-2. But Gazprom’s intention to take a minority stake in the Sakhalin-2 project has been clear for over a year and fits in with the scheme described above. Shell, the majority shareholder in the operating consortium, was given a choice: Either let Gazprom in or face the consequences.

Shtokman, by contrast, was a clean slate. If Gazprom has decided to proceed without bringing in foreign partners based on political motivations, and despite the economic consequences, the rules have changed and we could be entering a new period of instability in the investment climate. Shtokman might signal the end of the paradigm of cooperation between the national champions and foreign firms, and thus the unraveling of Putin’s oft-noted pragmatism in dealings with foreign energy majors. As relations between Russia and the West continue to deteriorate, we could see other key decisions subjugated to the political whims of the Kremlin. The investment climate will inevitably suffer as a result.

The lesson from this episode is that political systems in which power is highly concentrated in the executive branch tend to be incapable of long-term credible commitment to policies necessary for the development of market economies. Of course, the total fragmentation of a political system is also not conducive to economic development, either, and this was part of the motivation behind Putin’s centralization drive. But the pendulum may now have swung too far in the opposite direction. The previous period of perceived stability in the investment climate could well have been a short-lived phenomenon.

Oct. 30, 2006

A Big Capitalist Thank You

The Kremlin Holds a Reception for Buyers and Sellers of Rosneft.

On Friday Russian President Vladimir Putin held a closed meeting with the leaders of the international companies who participated in Rosneft’s IPO. Mr. Putin revealed that his sympathies lie with the oilmen in the global competition between Rosneft and Gazprom for credit funds from Western banks in 2007 by steadfastly directing his audience’s attention to the growth in Rosneft’s capitalization from $80 billion to $92 billion. After the meeting, which lasted no more than an hour, the international guests were shipped off to the Pushkin museum for a banquet in the company of Roman Abramovich, Oleg Deripaska, and Vladimir Lisin, but without the Russian president.

The list of attendees included Dresdner Bank Kleinwort Wasserstein CEO Herbert Walter, Morgan Stanley CEO John Mack, Petronas vice-president George Ratilal, Barclays Capital board of directors chairman and CEO of JP Morgan William Winters, former CSFB CEO and current chairman of the executive committee at Barclays Capital Hans-Joerg Rudloff, Sinopec board of directors chairman Chen Tonghai, Alfa-Bank president Peter Aven, and Sberbank board of directors chairman Andrei Kazmin. They all have one thing in common: they participated in Rosneft’s initial public offering in summer 2006 (DrKW, Morgan Stanley, Barclays, and JP Morgan provided the biggest chunk of investment). Friday’s meeting was conceived by presidential aide and Rosneft board of directors chairman Igor Sechin and Rosneft president Sergei Bogdanchikov as nothing short of a triumphant reception for the company’s foreign investors.

The bank ABN Amro, which was not officially listed among the companies invited, confirmed that its representative had attended, but in response to Kommersant’s requests for comments refused to say anything further. “How did you find out about that?” replied a bank representative.

The only participant who was forthcoming with information on the proceedings was President Putin himself, whose press service announced the event and published the speech he gave during the open part of the meeting. In his speech, Mr. Putin briefly described the Russian economy’s perspectives for development, paying particular attention to the government’s priority of lowering annual inflation to 4-6% within the next few years.

Despite doubts voiced by several of Kommersant’s sources concerning Mr. Putin’s real – i.e., economic – motives for the meeting, two participants in the proceedings later told Kommersant that the meeting really had been all about “thank you’s” from President Putin for the companies that had supported Rosneft in its IPO. However, if nothing else the Russian president undoubtedly wanted to show that his support for all things Gazprom does not mean that Rosneft has been forgotten. Both companies are viewed on the world market as guzzlers of capital: their credit needs are estimated at $15-25 billion per company. Continued foreign support is thus critical for the success of their public ventures, despite credit caps for 2007 of $25-30 billion on investments by Western banks in large Russian companies.

Gazprom Becomes the Bear of Russia

December 28, 2005 12:05

Last winter, the Kremlin-backed candidate in Ukraine’s contested presidential election lost to Viktor A. Yushchenko, the pro-Western leader of the Orange Revolution.

By Andrew E. Kramer

This winter, Russia is demanding almost a fivefold increase in the price of gas supplied to Ukraine, a change widely seen as payback for Moscow’s embarrassment a year ago.

At the center of this geopolitical game is Gazprom, Russia’s natural gas monopoly, the country’s largest company and the producer of a third of the world’s supply of natural gas. Gazprom is a corporation aspiring to join the ranks of energy majors like Exxon Mobil and BP, with the scope and bulk to operate worldwide. It is also a powerful instrument of Russia’s emerging foreign policy doctrine, which rests on energy exports - and the power and prestige they bring - in place of lost military might.

Gazprom, which opened its shares to foreign buyers this month, is seeking institutional investors and acceptance in Western markets to further its goals. In the conflict with Ukraine, however, Gazprom is at risk of appearing as a tool of the Kremlin - used to punish a pro-Western government in Eastern Europe - rather than as a modern company that could claim to be attractive to institutional investors.

Yet Gazprom’s new pricing policy in Ukraine would also benefit stockholders; Gazprom could earn more than $3 billion next year by raising prices. Far from being a mere tool, some analysts see Gazprom - Russia’s most important company - as a driving force in pushing the Kremlin’s Ukraine policy with the intention of increasing profits from energy sales.

“If you own Gazprom stock, you accept that it is a political arm of the Russian government,” said William F. Browder, the chief executive of Hermitage Capital Management here.

The negotiation of market prices in Ukraine comes amid a larger, long-running effort at Gazprom to streamline - moving away from its origins as a Soviet ministry and into its role as modern corporation - with uncertain results so far.

Gazprom accounts for 10 percent of Russia’s economic activity. But it is sprawling, inefficiently managed and overstaffed, with divisions running everything from newspapers to poultry farms far outside its core business, and it is often seen as a slush fund for the Kremlin’s off-the-books needs.

Still, Gazprom is one of the world’s largest energy companies, as measured by the volume of its proven reserves. It controls more crude oil and equivalent in natural gas than Iraq. The company has rights to huge, unexplored fields in eastern Siberia; it is expected to win tax concessions next spring to develop them.

It is also actively opening new markets. The company is in the midst of a program to redraw the energy map of Europe by building underwater pipelines in the Black and Baltic Seas, extending the reach and scale of its sales to the West and competing with efforts by companies in the United States to sell liquefied natural gas from the Middle East in Europe.

In the Far East, Gazprom is promising to supply China’s exploding energy needs with two gas pipelines; it has promised gas to Japan and South Korea as well.

Yet Gazprom trades at a fraction of the price of other oil majors, partly because of the restriction on foreign ownership, but also because of uncertainty over the company’s role.

With the effort to liberalize ownership, Gazprom is feeling the friction between its traditional role within the Russian government and its need to act like a major corporation amid energy prices that are bringing in billions of dollars in profits, at a scale exceptional even for a company that has always been rolling in cash.

Aramco, the Saudi Arabian state oil company that is not publicly traded, holds more reserves. But Gazprom is projected to become, with the liberalization, the largest emerging market stock and the largest freely traded energy company in the world.

“Gazprom is the beautiful girl at the dance,” Mr. Browder said.

Gazprom expects to earn $66 billion next year. But the company is capitalized at $159 billion, or roughly half that of the world’s largest company by stock value, the General Electric Company, which has a market capitalization of $373 billion, according to the Reuters news agency.

Analysts and diplomats who follow Russian energy policy say the company will easily double in value in the next year or two, after share liberalization.

President Vladimir V. Putin signed a decree Friday lifting a 20 percent cap on foreign ownership and a prohibition on nonresidents owning shares traded on Russian domestic stock exchanges.

The wide acquisition of Gazprom stock by the Moscow elite in recent years means that now many of the same people who craft Russia’s foreign policy are also large Gazprom stockholders, according to analysts. Their inclination to use Gazprom as a foreign policy tool is thus tempered by their personal stake in seeing the company run as a business.

Mr. Putin installed new management, including Aleksei Miller, the chief executive, and, as chairman, Dmitry Medvedev, who is also a deputy prime minister. Both are members of a young faction in the Russian leadership from St. Petersburg, Mr. Putin’s hometown. Mr. Miller’s compensation includes Gazprom stock.

Mr. Browder said, “On any yacht in the south of France this summer chartered by Russians, you would hear talk about the price of Gazprom stock.”

Mr. Putin has also discussed Gazprom’s importance to Russia’s broader national interest, asserting that the country’s economic well-being is riding on energy exports. In televised comments on Thursday, Mr. Putin said that bringing good corporate governance to energy companies was in Russia’s national interest.

“We need more than digging in the ground and sometimes barbarically extracting resources,” Mr. Putin said.

The company held a conference call last week, wooing analysts and investors with promises of cost-cutting and management reforms; it promises to break with the past and operate a business as clean and powerful as the fuel it sells.

“We’re looking for institutional investors,” a Gazprom spokesman, Sergei Kupriyanov, said in an interview.

“Calpers is our dream investor,” he said, referring to the California Public Employees’ Retirement System, which handles the pension accounts of 1.4 million state and municipal workers and retirees and is one of the largest pools of investment capital in the world.

High on the list of changes at Gazprom that investors are seeking is leveling prices between Western Europe, the former Soviet Union and Russia’s domestic market. Prices range from $30 or so in Russia to more than $200 in Western Europe.

The effort is uneven, however, and tainted by politics.

Gazprom is not raising prices in Belarus, a country firmly in Moscow’s orbit. Under the 2006 contract, gas will sell there for $47 for 1,000 cubic meters. Gazprom says the lower price is justified because Belarus has surrendered control of its transit pipeline to Gazprom.

As payment in Ukraine, Gazprom has offered to take shares in Ukrainian companies or, as in Belarus, take partial control over the gas pipelines.

[On Monday, Bloomberg News reported that Ukraine’s prime minister, Yuri I. Yekhanurov, had rejected Gazprom’s offer to guarantee fuel supplies in exchange for a stake in the country’s pipeline network. “Ukraine will not sell its gas pipeline system,” Mr. Yekhanurov said in Zhytomyr, Ukraine, in remarks broadcast by Channel 5 television. “It’s prohibited by law.”]

To some in Ukraine, Gazprom’s talk of market pricing rings hollow.

“It’s a myth,” Volodymyr I. Polokhalo, a senior researcher at the Institute of International Relations in the Ukrainian Academy of Science, said. “What market price can grow three or four times in a year? This is political blackmail.”

Mr. Polokhalo said Mr. Yushchenko’s inability to get a deal from Gazprom would play into the hands of pro-Russian opposition parties in parliamentary elections in March, including the Party of Regions of Viktor Yanukovich, the Kremlin-backed candidate who lost in the Orange Revolution.

Rising gas prices would strike hardest at the industrial belt in eastern and central Ukraine, Mr. Yanukovich’s stronghold, deepening Ukraine’s political divide and damaging Mr. Yushchenko.

“In this case Gazprom isn’t a company. It’s an instrument entirely in the hand of the president,” of Russia, Mr. Polokhalo said.

Back in Russia, Gazprom shares keep going up. The locally traded stock rose 150 percent this year; American depository receipts traded in London rose 118 percent.

“The goal is to drive the price of Gazprom through the roof,” said one Western diplomat who spoke on condition of anonymity because of protocol. “For Gazprom it’s a nice twofer. You punish Ukraine and make money doing it. There’s a few hundred guys in the Kremlin with financial interest in Gazprom.”

January 16, 2003

Russian Business Monopoly Gazprom’s Great Need

Why solving the gas concern’s debt problem will lead to higher domestic gas prices

Yulia Novosyolova and Dmitri Sivakov

We have examined Gazprom’s finances. But before we go any further into what we found, we need to state our reasons for doing so. A couple of years ago, we began to wonder about the company after comparing two figures – Gazprom’s revenue and its accumulated debt. At that time, these figures were $12.4 billion and about $12 billion, respectively. A question immediately came to mind: wasn’t Gazprom right on the edge of default and bankruptcy? Based on Gazprom’s annual reports from 1995 to 1999 (information not easy to obtain back then), it turned out that debt didn’t threaten Gazprom’s solvency as long as annual payments didn’t exceed $7 billion. The general information about Gazprom’s proceeds, net profits, and accumulated debt implied that everything was financially all right. However, to judge the company’s financial health accurately, we would have needed detailed information on the company’s debt structure, long-term borrowing programs, refinancing, and current cash on hand.

Many things have changed over the past two years. Gazprom has become a more open company: it started sharing more comprehensive data on its activities with the public. In particular, Gazprom released information about its debts due in 2002 totaling $7.5 billion. This figure alone, as we have already mentioned, should set off alarms. But there were more than enough other reasons to prick up our ears. Since then, the gas monopoly’s leaders have been changed fundamentally: Alexei Miller’s team replaced Rem Vyakhirev’s team. The new people were not from the so-called gas gang, which meant that Gazprom’s finances began to face additional risks. In the past year, these risks have come to the surface: Gazprom appears to be digging through the market in search of cash, borrowing from many lenders in relatively small amounts (for Gazprom of course). Previously, Gazprom had little trouble borrowing practically any amount (up to $3 billion) for its investment needs. Naturally, the former leadership’s departure might provoke a wary, conservative reaction from the world gas community, more used to lending to concrete people for concrete projects, not to the company in general. When these people were replaced with unfamiliar faces, creditors, well aware of the company’s business, recalled old political risks and prior conservatism. In short, they stopped lending large amounts to Mr. Miller and his team. This is only a hypothetical version of events, but considering other facts and factors, it is plausible enough to make us seriously afraid for Gazprom’s finances.

But this is not the whole story. The company’s increasing transparency has given observers new food for thought, the details of Gazprom’s investments projects and investments needs. Gas production at the leading Gazprom’s deposits in the Nadym-Pur-Tazovsky area is swiftly falling. Meanwhile, gas supplies to Western Europe are growing under current contracts that don’t expire until 2030. This means a gas shortage will hit Russia before long. As for investment resources required to develop large deposits on the Yamal Peninsula, the price tag is shocking – up to $140 billion. Even given that Yamal will be developed over the next twenty years, Gazprom will have to set aside (or borrow!) another $7 billion a year for its investment needs.

If you put all these pieces together, the situation is frightening in earnest. Gazprom is obviously in no position to set aside $14 billion a year ($7 billion for old debt plus $7 billion for investments) from its revenues (a “mere” $27 billion) or to borrow this amount for the long term.

And finally, a last remark. Having realized the gravity of the problem, we tried to find out about how Gazprom and the Russian government are attempting to solve it. We discovered that using gas mains as collateral for securing Western investment loans was being discussed seriously as an option. If the government and Gazprom officials are discussing this approach, then things really look grim.

Deep in debt

The proposed $100-billion loan using gas mains as collateral, of course, has never been discussed in full. Nevertheless, the monopoly’s need for a regular cash injection has become frightening clear. Early this summer, the company turned to the Central Bank requesting permission to borrow from Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank several hundred millions of dollars over the Central Bank’s loan per borrower regulations. The Central Bank declined the request, after which the monopoly had to double its borrowing on the domestic market.

Gazprom has had to pay $7.5 billion on debts this year. Without refinancing, these payments could become a greater burden than Gazprom can bear, leaving the company on the verge of default. In order to avoid trouble, the company had to borrow at least $6 billion in 2002, with at least $3 billion as short-term loans and bonds. And in order to reduce the pressure of short-term debts (See Graphics 1 and 2), the monopoly made an attempt to expand its list of creditors and long-term loans. However, this is no easy task. The company has already put up 70% of its export revenues as collateral by now, while according to EBRD and other banks’ recommendations, this figure shouldn’t exceed 60%. This is why the gas giant has had to resort to overactive borrowing on the Russian market and Western unsecured loans.

In Russia, one of the monopoly’s largest creditors is Mezhprombank, which has lent $100 million. In September, the company and the bank signed an cooperation agreement for 2002-2005. But Russian banks cannot make large loans to Gazprom, since they exceed the official lending limits. Gazprom tried to borrow in the West, which offers lower rates and longer terms. The only problem was that the company couldn’t use its revenue as collateral and had get unsecured loans, which is much more difficult. Nonetheless, Gazprom succeeded (See Table 1). The monopoly’s troubles don’t end there, though. Next year, the concern is due to pay $7.95 billion: $2.9 billion for long-term loans, $2.8 billion for short-term loans, and $800 million on bonds (the rest consists of other kinds of debt). Refinancing will cost $3.56 billion, a considerable part of which Gazprom intends to raise by selling eurobonds. However, the Ministry of Finance, which has stayed away from foreign markets since the 1998 crisis, is trying to impose restrictions on corporate loans. It is anxious about international corporate debt, now out of its control. The Ministry considers 60% of the GDP as the critical level for state and corporate debt. According to figures for 2002, state debt is expected to decline from over 50% to 40% of the GDP, and corporate loans are expected to total 13%. This makes 53%, but as early as 2003, this figure could increase, mostly because Gazprom plans to issue at least $1.2 billion in eurobonds.

Throughout this year, Gazprom has managed to increase the gas rates on the domestic market considerably by lobbying the FEC and the Ministry of Economic Development. At a meeting on December 11, the government decided to increase gas prices by 20%. We are haunted by the persistent feeling that Gazprom cannot cope with its debt on its own and is sorting it out at our expense.

Looking for explanations, we turned to Gazprom directly and spoke with Boris Orlov, the company’s CFO (see interview). We were convinced that Russia shouldn’t be anxious about the gas company’s finances for the present despite its difficulties. Gazprom’s main problems, it turns out, are production and investment, not debt.

Negative production

Over the last decade, the level of gas production at Gazprom has been declining. While in 1991 it produced 600 billion m3, in 2001 it produced only 512 billion m3 (See Graphic 3). Gazprom has many deposits in production, but the overwhelming majority of its gas comes from three deposits, Yamburg, Urengoi and Medvezhie. They all are located in Yamal-Nenetsky District, Nadym-Pur-Tazovsky Area. These deposits, some of the largest in the world, came into service almost thirty years ago. They all are on the verge of depletion.

According to Gazprom Deputy Chairman Alexander Ananenkov, the company “receives 20-25 billion m3 of gas less than its target every year because of the depletion of traditional deposits.” By 2015, gas production will have fallen to half, and the Russian market will plunge into a severe gas shortage.

The very large Zapolyarnoye gas deposit could prevent this grim outcome, and Gazprom managed to start developing it in 2001. It sits near the deposits of Nadym-Pur-Tazovsky area, not far from existing gas pipelines. The planned production capacity at the Zapolyarnoye deposit is 100 billion m3 of gas a year. This target will supposedly be reached by 2005, thereby saving us from gas shortage. But are such rates realistic?

In mid-October, Ananenkov made a business trip to Novy Urengoy, Zapolyarnoye, and Yamburg. As a tour at Urengoygazprom showed, there are more than enough problems at the newly opened deposit areas. The main problem is the shortage of financial resources. At the meeting, Mr. Ananenkov demanded that production speed up. Representatives from Urengoygazprom responsible for developing the Urengoy deposit, from Gazprom Engineering responsible for design and cost estimates, and from Gazkomplektimpex responsible for logistics made their reports to the high official. Though the reports started off in the spirit of “we’re on top of the world,” they invariably concluded with the phrase: “If we only had some money….” During the course of the meeting, it became clear that contractors were about to quit, there was no money for workers’ wages, no pipes, and no design estimates for some projects. The Zapolyarnoye deposit, Gazprom’s principal hope for the next few years, faces even greater financial problems. Its development will cost $7 billion, $7 billion Gazprom doesn’t have. Last year, the first plant with a 35 billion m3 annual capacity began to operate at the Zapolyarnoye deposit (there will be a total of three). A second plant of the same capacity was supposed to start operating in the end of September. Its opening was postponed to December because of a shortage of funds. Over the last two months, the company has extracted 6 billion m3 less than its targets, and it will have to make deliveries using other resources.

But even solving these current difficulties would not prevent a Russian gas shortage. The Zapolyarnoye deposit will only delay its coming. Estimates show that by 2008, increased production at Zapolyarnoye will not compensate for reduced production at Urengoy, Yamburg and Medvezhie. Gazprom needs to develop new large gas deposits now.

New deposits

Gazprom’s options are limited. There is the large Shtokmanskoye deposit on the shelf of Barents Sea. Then there are several very large gas deposits on Yamal Peninsula.

Both areas are located far from Gazprom’s present transportation and residential infrastructures and in even harsher environmental conditions than the deposits of Nadym-Pur-Tazovsky area. Their development will require astronomically more funds than Zapolyarnoye.

Take, for example, the Shtokmanovskoye gas deposit. It will have to be developed underwater, a thousand km away from main gas pipelines. A gas main will have to be laid, most of it along the floor of the Barents Sea. Gazprom lacks the experience and technology, making the development of the Shtokmanskoye deposit without the help of foreigners and Russian oil companies practically hopeless. This means Gazprom will have to share the profits. This fact alone reduces the site’s appeal, although the monopoly has already almost found enough Western partners and investors to develop the Shtokmanovskoye deposit. The price will run from $12 to 25 billion.

The Yamal Peninsula deposits are more attractive. They are larger and a bit closer. They will require no “maritime” technology whatsoever. Yamal’s reserves can ensure high and stable production of the “blue fuel,” but $50 to 70 billion will be required to this end. To make matters worse, more than half the funds will be needed in the next few years to develop the Bovanenkovskoye deposit that will “open” the peninsula in 2007. Developing Yamal is expensive because the deposits are over 500 km away from the gas transport systems, and they won’t produce until this infrastructure is set up. So, a new gas-transport network at Yamal alone will require $25 to 30 billion. About another $7 billion will go toward a new Yamal-Europe pipeline. Renovating existing gas mains will require more than $5 billion.

In total, Gazprom needs to invest around $100 billion in the next twenty years. Some sources put this figure as high as $140 billion. Today, Gazprom is in no position to attract this sum of money from the market or to save it on its own. This problem cannot be put off until tomorrow, since license agreements are pressing (See Table 2). Should Gazprom fall behind in putting new deposits into production, these licenses could be revoked, and the company could lose over 22% of gas reserves with relatively low production cost located close to the existing infrastructure.

How to rescue Gazprom

In Gazprom’s opinion, it’s as easy as pie. For a start, Russian customers should pay more for gas. The Federal Energy Committee agrees. According to government specialists, gas production and delivery costs an estimated $18 per 1,000 m3 on average, practically equal to its price (See Table 3). Therefore, at the FEC they are confident that Gazprom needs to raise the consumer price of gas to pursue a normal investment policy. According Gazprom, in order to increase annual gas production to 530 billion m3 and maintain this level, the company needs to invest $500 million a year, and increase the price of gas by 40-50%. Gazprom estimates that 1,000 m3 of gas costs 126.8 rubles ($4.09) to produce, 382.9 rubles ($12.35) to transport, and 773 rubles ($24.93) to sell and deliver to consumers. Thus, the total sales costs are estimated at twice the production costs.

As domestic demand for gas is growing, the government and the company propose encouraging gas production by independent producers and give them access to the gas pipeline system in order to prevent a shortage. However, industrial consumers will receive this gas already at market prices. These will surely be higher than the FEC’s new prices, since gas market liberalization will exclusively benefit Gazprom. There have been more than enough state proposals in the past aimed at reforming the gas industry. The company was not happy with many of them. Some recommended Chubais’ favorite strategy: split up Gazprom and to sell the parts. Now, the FEC is proposing a new Federal Wholesale Gas Market (FWGM) with a regulated and non-regulated sector. The situation is clear as far as the regulated sector is concerned: the FEC sets the rates for gas going to private customers, public organizations, and communally heated housing. Everyone else will buy gas on the open market. A non-commercial organization founded by Gazprom jointly with gas suppliers and consumers (the only question is in what proportion) will act as an administrator. Gas distribution and sale in both sectors will be carried out by organizations authorized by Gazprom. However, the company will have to engage independent sale agents on the non-regulated market. Full liberalization of the market will happened in 2008 at the very earliest.

How Gazprom can save itself

It looks as if Gazprom has heard the voice of reason and began to cut costs. The giant’s top executives now proclaim that the company will reduce costs almost by $1 billion in 2003.

Apart from loans, the company’s diverse joint projects could help stop the decline in gas production. For example, in a joint venture with Kazakhstan, Kazmunaigaz owns 50%, Gazprom – 30%, and Rosneft – 20%. In 2001, Kazakhstan produced 12 billion m3 of gas, a quarter of which was simply burnt when they failed to sell it. After the joint venture, Kazakhstan could increase production up to 50 billion m3 a year. Recently Gazprom signed agreements with Surgutneftgaz to cooperate in the deep development of existing deposits (so-called Achimovsky gas condensate fields) and with LUKoil to develop Yamal and the North Caspian Sea. More opportunities lie in granting independent gas producers access to the pipe. However, Gazprom insists that these very independent producers sell their gas in Russia, not abroad.

Getting used to expensive gas

A sad picture is taking shape. As long as Gazprom struggles to sort out its debt and to ensure at least a minimum of capital investment to keep up the current level of gas production, we will not see the development of new deposits. It’s clear that Gazprom cannot overcome this situation without a dramatic increase in domestic gas prices.

We could escape basically unscathed by increasing unreasonably low gas prices (see Table 3) for the former Soviet republics. This does not seem likely to happen, however, in the foreseeable future. The government is intent on using Gazprom as a stick or carrot in its dialogue on gas prices with our neighbors. The problem of money owed to Gazprom, especially from state customers, will hardly be solved within the next few years. The company will have a hard time making use of these obvious sources of additional income.

Industrial customers are also against big price increases. Their main argument is that gas gives Russian manufacturers a competitive advantage. There is a way to deal with both Gazprom’s problems and industrialists’ reasonable objections. Gas prices should be indexed not to Gazprom’s schemes but to the average standard of living in Russia. Only this way can Russia’s gas monopoly be converted to a normal commercial enterprise, where business problems are solved not by lobbying for price hikes but by reducing costs and improving service.

Alexei Miller, rusul care ne aduce caldura sau frigul

Seful Gazprom este, de departe, cel mai important strain pentru Romania. In spatele lui Putin este omul care ne influenteaza factura la gaz sau temperatura din casa.

Bossul de la Gazprom s-a nascut la sfirsitul lui ianuarie 1962 la Leningrad, actualul Sankt Petersburg. Tinarul Alexei a terminat liceul in 1979, dupa care a mers la Institutul de Finante si Economie „N.A. Voznesenskii“ din acelasi oras. Dupa absolvire a ramas in oras, si, dupa ce a devenit inginer-economist si a lucrat la Institutul de Constructii Civile si Design, s-a intors la Institutul de Finante si Economie, unde a ajuns cercetator. Anul 1990 l-a gasit pe viitorul sef al Gazprom la consiliul primariei din Leningrad, unde se ocupa de reforma economica, iar anul urmator il gasim lucrind alaturi de viitorul presedinte al Rusiei, Vladimir Putin. Din 1991 pina in 1996, Miller a lucrat la Comitetul pentru Relatii Externe al primarului din Sankt Petersburg, ajungind director adjunct al acestuia. In aceeasi perioada a activat si Putin la primarie, in 1994 ajungind seful pentru relatii externe al primarului orasului. Cu alte cuvinte, Miller ii era oarecum subordonat lui Putin in aceeasi institutie.

In 1996, primarul Sobceak a pierdut alegerile locale din Sankt Petersburg, iar Putin, cel care conducea de fapt treburile de zi cu zi ale orasului, a ajuns la Moscova, devenind ceva mai tirziu sef al FSB (noua denumire a KGB), apoi prim-ministru al Rusiei si, in 2000, presedinte. In acelasi an, Alexei Miller a fost numit ministru adjunct al Energiei in Federatia Rusa si, un an mai tirziu, presedinte al Comitetului Director al Gazprom.

Gaz scump

Poate ca nimic nu ar ilustra mai bine puterea pe care o exercita Miller in Romania decit presiunea scazuta la gaz pe care au resimtit-o romanii la inceputul acestui an. De vina ar fi fost un conflict intre Rusia si Ucraina, dar efectul pentru noi, ca si pentru o parte a Europei Occidentale, a fost acelasi: am primit mai putin gaz.

Cu acea ocazie s-a spus ca Romania plateste cel mai mare pret pentru gazul rusesc - 285 de dolari pe mia de metri cubi. De ce? Pentru ca asa a vrut Miller. Cu Gazprom nu se negociaza, doar se discuta. „Romania plateste pretul pe care trebuie sa-l plateasca“, declara in vara, la Bucuresti, adjunctul lui Miller, Medvedev.

Gazprom vinde cui vrea

Si nu oricine discuta cu Gazpromul lui Miller (sau al lui Putin, cum doriti). Compania rusa are „clienti“ preferentiali carora le vinde gazul, iar acestia revind marfa companiilor care o aduc in casele oamenilor. Asadar, Miller, chiar si dupa ce scoate moleculele de gaz din Rusia, detine controlul asupra lor.

Cazul cel mai elocvent pentru noi: in vara, Gazprom a incheiat cu grupul Conef (proprietarul intregii industrii a aluminiului din Romania, care nu putea fi, normal, decit un rus) cel mai mare contract de livrare de gaz rusesc in Romania. Rusul de la Conef a primit, pentru urmatorii 25 de ani, cite doua miliarde de metri cubi de gaz de la Gazprom, pe care sa le vinda in Romania. Adica o cantitate egala cu tot consumul Romaniei pe trei ani. Este cel mai lung contract semnat de Gazprom pentru livrari de gaz in Romania.

Gazprom, copilul favorit al Kremlinului

Revista Capital – 8 Iulie 2004

Aflat in deplina si eterna proprietate a statului rus, Gazprom este principalul motor al economiei nationale si un foarte eficace instrument de politica externa al Kremlinului. Despre Gazprom, o veritabila emblema a puterii economice si politice a Moscovei, se poate vorbi numai in superlative si cifre mari, foarte mari: venituri de 27 miliarde de dolari, 150.000 km de gazoducte care impanzesc Europa si Asia, 300.000 de angajati, un sediu de 35 de etaje care domina capitala rusa, un trust media de 30 de publicatii si posturi radio si TV, hoteluri, cluburi de yachting, scoli, aeroporturi etc. etc. In economia rusa, Gazprom reprezinta 8% din PIB, furnizeaza 25% din veniturile fiscale ale statului, iar pentru presedintele Putin conteaza atat ca propulsor al economiei, cat si ca vehicul al politicilor sociale, intrucat ofera populatiei produse energetice la preturi de cinci-sapte ori mai mici decat cele de export si, oricum, plasate cu mult sub costuri. Politicile de export ale Gazprom nu sunt, insa, un model de generozitate si eleganta. Dimpotriva, ele speculeaza din plin conjuncturile favorabile de pe pietele internationale; desi vinde in pierdere pe piata interna peste trei sferturi din productie, profitul companiei este de 25%. Practicile obscure ale Gazprom provoaca demisii in guvernele de la Varsovia, Vilnius ori Tbilisi sau, dimpotriva, finanteaza pe veresie regimuri politice precum acela al lui Milosevici.Gazprom nu este, totusi, ca pe vremea Sovietelor, o simpla coada de topor a politicii externe. Rolul sau de pompier care tine sub control focarele din zona de influenta a Moscovei a devenit mai curand ocazional si secundar. Dupa cum nici nu mai este, ca acum cativa ani, o biata vaca de muls pentru tranzactiile dubioase ale managerilor sai, in ciuda scandalului izbucnit recent in jurul modului cum s-au cheltuit nejustificat ori s-au pierdut, prin contracte in favoarea unor intermediari dubiosi, sume totalizand peste doua miliarde de dolari. Asemenea situatii nu vor inceta sa apara, iar adevaratul lor substrat – fraude ordinare ori miscari subtile de fonduri in labirintul bugetului de stat – nu va fi cunoscut atata vreme cat compania ramane perfect opaca pentru piata, ca si pentru marele public: conturile ei sunt prezentate sumar si confuz, valoarea patrimoniului este controversata (undeva, in plaja dintre 17 si 50 de miliarde de dolari) si chiar structura actionariatului ramane o mare enigma, cu exceptia amanuntului ca statul rus este majoritar, cu 38%. Ceea ce face, in cele din urma, o diferenta semnificativa intre vechiul si noul Gazprom este capacitatea sa de a etala o veritabila strategie de expansiune. Imprejurarile ii sunt mai mult decat favorabile. Simpla extindere a UE face ca ponderea importurilor acesteia din Rusia, acum de 17 miliarde de dolari, in consum sa creasca de la 25% la circa 60%. Iar uriasele zacaminte siberiene si caspice, cuplate cu imensele oportunitati de pe pietele emergente au generat proiecte de exploatare, transport si distributie care merg pana in Israel, China, Coreea si Vietnam, fara sa excluda Mexicul, Canada si SUA. Dar, desi face anual investitii de 5 miliarde de dolari, planurile Gazprom exced cu mult resursele proprii.Solutiile gasite sunt pragmatice si promitatoare. Primul pas a fost securizarea comerciala a coridoarelor de transport catre Europa, prin preluarea de pachete de actiuni si investitii in tarile central-est-europene; in cazurile rebele si in regiunea CSI s-au folosit fara ezitare presiunile politico-economice. Al doilea pas, crearea de alternative la coridoarele europene existente, ceea ce reduce considerabil dependenta de tarile de tranzit. In acest moment sunt in faze diferite de proiectare sau executie: un nou gazoduct polonez (Yamal 2), cel nord-european (prin Marea Baltica si Scandinavia, catre Marea Britanie) si cel din Ucraina, coridorul Blue Stream (pentru Turcia), deja functional. In al treilea rand, s-a urmarit atragerea in proiecte comune si parteneriate a marilor jucatori europeni: Wintershall, Ruhrgas, Gaz de France, ENI. Alianta cu cel dintai, in cadrul WinGas, este esentiala; valabila deocamdata pana in 2030, ea anunta o foarte probabila imparatie de 1.000 de ani ruso-germana in sectorul european. In fine, s-a urmarit cu obstinatie implicarea in proiecte importante, de 3-18 miliarde de dolari, in echipa cu toti “granzii” mondiali, de la BP si Shell la Exxon, Conoco si Chevron.Toate acestea ar trebui sa faca din Gazprom, pana la sfarsitul deceniului, ceea ce nu este, cu adevarat, in acest moment: o companie globala. Cu conditia ca Moscova sa accepte accesul investitorilor straini si, implicit, sa faca lumina in administrarea companiei. Pentru Kremlin, este alegerea dintre a se situa, pe plan mondial, in ofensiva economica ori a ramane in defensiva politica.

Gazprom isi protejeaza prietenii din Romania

Revista Capital – 23 Mai 2006

Acordul pentru gazul rusesc importat de firma Conef a fost parafat la Moscova de catre omul de afaceri Vitali Matsitski, omul din spatele Alro, si Alexey Miller, presedintele Gazprom.

Vizita vicepresedintelui Gazprom, Alexander Medvedev, la Bucuresti a avut drept scop impunerea unui partener local drept principal importator de gaze naturale, adica a actionarului majoritar de la Alro Slatina, grupul Marco, condus din umbra de catre oligarhul rus Vitali Matsitski. Acesta controleaza, prin mai multe vehicule financiare dintre care cel mai important este Marco Group, industria de aluminiu din Romania, mai precis Alro si Alprom Slatina si Alum Tulcea. Tot el este omul din umbra Conef si Imex Oil, principalii intermediari de gaze naturale.

Surprinzatoare, insa, a fost prezenta ministrului Economiei, Codrut seres, la anuntarea de catre Medvedev a unui acord privat care nu implica din punct de vedere contractual statul roman. Surse din cadrul ministerului spun ca ministrul seres a fost luat prin surprindere de folosirea conferintei de presa in scopuri comerciale. “Ce era sa facem, puteam sa-l suparam pe rus?”, spun sursele citate. Povestea pretului ridicat platit de Romania la importul de gaze naturale este infirmata astfel de parafarea unui contract care vorbeste despre preturi cu pana la 20 de dolari mai mici decat cele platite de Romgaz pentru importul celor peste trei miliarde de metri cubi de gaze naturale de la Gazexport prin Wintershall. Un semnal de alarma l-a tras si presedintele Traian Basescu atunci cand vorbea despre comisioanele mari incasate de intermediari.

“Atat Miller, cat si vicepresedintele Alexander Medvedev sunt maini drepte ale lui Vladimir Putin. Matsitski are acces la Medvedev, avand implicit acces la resurse ieftine”, sustin surse bine documentate din cadrul comunitatii rusesti de afaceri. “Cooperarea dintre Conef si Gazexport a inceput in 2002. Gazul natural furnizat in cadrul acestui parteneriat a contribuit substantial la atingerea nevoilor Romaniei de a importa gaze naturale. In perioada scursa de atunci, prin cele patru contracte dintre Gazexport si Conef, Romania a primit 4,5 miliarde metri cubi de gaze naturale”. Asa explica biroul de presa al Gazprom relatia pe care gigantul rus o are cu firma romaneasca. Ca o comparatie, trebuie spus ca Romania a importat in 2005 o cantitate totala de 4,5 miliarde metri cubi de gaz rusesc.

In plus, de la Gazprom ni s-a transmis ca “cele doua parti si-au exprimat opinia ca semnarea acordului pe termen deschide noi orizonturi, atat pentru Conef, cat si pentru alti importatori si consumatori de gaz rusesc”. Cu alte cuvinte, gazul importat de Romania din Rusia prin firma Conef are drept destinatar firmele rusesti de la noi. Gazprom loveste doi iepuri dintr-o lovitura: vinde gazele tot printr-o firma ruseasca si sustine dezvoltarea afacerilor rusilor din Romania.

Din zona serviciilor secrete romanesti exista informatii potrivit carora patronul de la Alro nu este strain de serviciile secrete rusesti care opereaza in Romania, dar nici de compania mixta de import, inmagazinare si desfacere de gaze naturale in depozitul de inmagazinare subterana de la Roman-Margineni, dintre Romgaz si Gazprom. Scenariu pe care, de altfel, incercam sa-l confirmam in continuare.

Astfel, un control al Garzii Financiare, finalizat cu un proces verbal incheiat la data de 3 iunie 2003, scotea la iveala faptul ca, in perioada 2001-2003, firma Conef a inregistrat in contul de cheltuieli cu servicii executate de terti mai multe contracte de prestari de servicii externe in valoare de peste doua milioane de dolari. Imex Oil, de exemplu, provine din Cipru. Dar nu acest lucru ne intereseaza in primul rand pe noi. In contestatia judecata la Curtea de Apel si care mai apoi s-a finalizat prin decizia nr 21 din 30 ianuarie 2004, Conef sustine ca unul dintre obiectele contractului de prestari de servicii incriminat viza “elaborarea de propuneri cu privire la efectuarea de amendamente si completari la contractul incheiat intre Guvernul Federatiei Ruse si Guvernul Romaniei privitor la marirea capacitatii de transport de gaze prin conducte, pentru a mari cantitatile de gaz natural furnizate Romaniei de Rusia”. In plus, firma cipriota elaborase pentru Conef “propuneri asupra parteneriatului strategic dintre societate si Gazprom pentru stabilirea unor activitati comune in comercializarea si transportarea gazului in Romania”. Propuneri care, iata, s-au materializat in 2006. Locul unde au fost redactate aceste modificari este sediul din Cipru al Imex Oil. Adica al treilea intermediar de gaze naturale pe relatia Gazprom-Romania.

Surse guvernamentale sustin, de altfel, ca reprezentantii Gazprom ar fi sugerat statului roman ca ar fi indicat ca firma Conef sa fie parte a conventiei interguvernamentale, dar ca membrii Guvernului au refuzat categoric. Toate demersurile Capital de a obtine o pozitie oficiala din partea Conef au esuat din motive care au tinut de lipsa managementului din tara.

Matsitski a electrizat Cotroceniul

O scrisoare a lui Vitali Matsitski la Controceni s-a lasat cu anularea unui contract de furnizare a energiei elecrice dintre Alro Slatina si un furnizor privat.

Ulterior, Alro a incheiat un contract direct cu Hidroelectrica devenind unul dintre consumatorii care beneficiaza de energie ieftina. Au existat voci care au sustinut ca aceasta modificare s-ar fi facut la presiunea Kremlinului si a Gazprom, realizandu-se in urma vizitei lui Traian Basescu la Moscova. Consilierul prezidential Theodor Stolojan ne-a declarat ca nu a fost vorba de asa ceva, ci doar de “o repunere in drepturi a celui mai mare consumator din Romania”.

Legaturi cu Abramovici sau cu Putin ?

Chiar daca in Romania s-a vehiculat ideea unui parteneriat intre Vitali Matsitski si Oleg Deripaska, presedintele Russian Aluminum si mogulul aluminiului rusesc, se pare ca cei doi sunt competitori directi. Deripaska este casatorit cu Polina Yumashev, fiica sefului de cabinet al fostului presedinte Boris Eltin, neaflandu-se in anturajul lui Vladimir Putin. Deripaska a incercat, de asemenea, sa preia Alro Slatina, dar a pierdut in favoarea Marco. Despre Matsitski se spune ca a reusit, de curand, sa preia, in China, doua capacitati de productie din domeniul aluminiului. Deripaska, in schimb, a rascumparat pachetul de actiuni al lui Roman Abramovici.

Disparitia lui Peter Braun

Peter Braun, evreu cu cetatenie americana si apropiat al “comunitatii rusesti”, au fost oamenii trimisi de Marco in Romania, vreme de cinci ani. Impreuna cu Alexander Krasner a fost artizanul privatizarii Alro Slatina prin metode reclamate a fi mai putin morale. Un raport scotea in evidenta implicarea in afacere a fostului ministru al Privatizarii, Ovidiu Musetescu. Braun si Krasner au disparut din viata Conef dupa ce Matsitski a declansat actiunea de preluarea a controlului total al Alro, Alprom si Alum. Alro, care detine peste trei procente din exportul Romaniei, a obtinut in ultimii ani profituri demne de admirat de orice antreprenor.

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Russia’s Gazprom delays LNG production in Shtokman

Sat Oct 28, 2006 3:50 PM GMT

Moscow (Reuters) - Gazprom, the world’s largest natural-gas producer, is raising investments to $69bn through 2009 to develop new fields amid concerns the company may not meet soaring demand in Russia and Europe.

Management approved an expanded investment budget this week because the company wants to speed up development of natural gas fields on the Yamal Peninsula, a key area for the Moscow-based company’s future production growth, chief financial officer Andrei Kruglov said today in an interview in London.

“If before the main accent was on the development of the gas transport system, pipelines, now it is on the development of gas fields,’’ Kruglov said. “New gas from these fields should enable sufficient financial flows to cover investment needs.’’

Gazprom, which supplies a quarter of Europe’s gas, is buying more fuel from Central Asian gas to meet soaring demand at home and in Europe.

Russia, which holds more than a quarter of the world’s gas reserves, may face fuel shortages at home because low, regulated prices discourage investment in production or on energy-efficient equipment and housing.

Gazprom has no specific plans to buy Centrica Plc or to bid for the assets of Russia’s bankrupt Yukos Oil Co, Kruglov said.

“Depending on what options there are and what will be coming up we will be reviewing specific cases,’’ he said when asked about Centrica and Yukos. As for Yukos, “we are not aware of any dates that have been officially announced about the auction.’’

Gazprom chief executive officer Alexei Miller has called Centrica, Britain’s biggest energy provider, an “interesting asset.’’

The company this month said it will develop the $20bn Shtokman field itself, spurning offers from five Western producers including Chevron Corp and Total SA to exploit the country’s biggest untapped natural-gas deposit.

President Vladimir Putin is seeking a bigger share of output for state companies in Russia, the world’s largest oil and gas producer.

“If it’s possible to develop fields ourselves, we’ll do it,’’ Kruglov said. “It’s far more profitable and creates additional financial flows which don’t have to be shared with anybody.’’

Profit may surge as much as 60% next year to between 430bn ($16bn) and 460bn rubles, from an expected 288bn rubles this year, based on Russian accounting standards, Kruglov said.

Some of the profit will go to investors as dividends as well as to capital expenditures, he said.

Gazprom shares fell 0.7% on Friday to $10.78 as of 4.04pm in Moscow, extending Thursday’s 1.4% slide on the Russian Trading System after the company announced its spending plans.

Moscow-based Deutsche Bank UFG was among the brokerages to say the spending forecast was higher than expected, which could limit cash flows and erode value.

Kruglov planned to meet investors on Friday to explain the investment programme. “I hope the relevant explanations will be accepted,’’ he said.

The company’s investments will surge 43% next year to 531.8bn rubles as it adds financing for field work to planned construction and maintenance of pipelines and storage facilities, Gazprom said on Thursday.

Investments over the next three years will amount to $69bn, including $55bn on capital expenditures.

The company aims to develop the Arctic Shtokman gas field, the Bovanenkovskoye and Kharasaveiskoye fields in the Yamal peninsula as well as the Yuzhno-Russkoye field, which the company is developing with BASF AG and E.ON AG and where production may start by 2008.

Gas from Shtokman and Yuzhno-Russkoye will be shipped to Europe through a pipeline being built under the Baltic Sea directly to Germany, avoiding intermediary countries such as Poland and Ukraine. The investment programme includes 90bn rubles a year over the next three years to build the Nord Stream pipeline, which is scheduled to open in 2010.

Gazprom is to delay production of liquefied natural gas from the vast Arctic Shtokman deposit in the Barents Sea, a senior company official was quoted as saying yesterday.

“The LNG project at Shtokman will be carried out after 2013 when the Shtokman deposit itself will be launched,” Interfax news agency quoted deputy CEO Alexander Ananenkov as saying in the central Russian city of Ufa.

Gazprom had earlier said an LNG plant at Shtokman would go into operation in 2011.

Gazprom this month announced it would be developing the field independently, abandoning years of planning to share the world’s biggest undeveloped gas field with two or three foreign partners able to bring technology and expertise.

Located in icy seas 550km (340 miles) off the coasts of Russia and Norway, Shtokman is a giant field which has reserves of around 3.7tn cu m of gas.

Discovered in 1988, the field was meant to be put on stream as early as 2000, but the project has been repeatedly postponed as Gazprom lacked funds and was unable to agree with Western companies on the financing.